The political economy of sugar-sweetened beverage taxation in Latin America: lessons from Mexico, Chile and Colombia. by Carriedo, Angela et al.
Carriedo et al. Globalization and Health            (2021) 17:5 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-020-00656-2RESEARCH Open AccessThe political economy of sugar-sweetened
beverage taxation in Latin America: lessons
from Mexico, Chile and Colombia
Angela Carriedo1* , Adam D. Koon2 , Luis Manuel Encarnación3 , Kelley Lee4 , Richard Smith5 and
Helen Walls6Abstract
Background: In Latin America, total sales of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) continue to rise at an alarming rate.
Consumption of added sugar is a leading cause of diet-related non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Coalitions of
stakeholders have formed in several countries in the region to address this public health challenge including
participation of civil society organizations and transnational corporations. Little is currently known about these
coalitions – what interests they represent, what goals they pursue and how they operate. Ensuring the primacy of
public health goals is a particular governance challenge. This paper comparatively analyses governance challenges
involved in the adoption of taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages in Mexico, Chile and Colombia. The three
countries have similar political and economic systems, institutional arrangements and regulatory instruments but
differing policy outcomes.
Methods: We analysed the political economy of SSB taxation based on a qualitative synthesis of existing empirical
evidence. We identify the key stakeholders involved in the policy process, identified their interests, and assess how
they influenced adoption and implementation of the tax.
Results: Coalitions for and against the SSB taxation formed the basis of policy debates in all three countries.
Intergovernmental support was critical to framing the SSB tax aims, benefits and implementation; and for countries
to adopt it. A major constraint to implementation was the strong influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in
the policy process. A lack of transparency during agenda setting was notably enhanced by the powerful presence
of TNCs.
Conclusion: NCDs prevention policies need to be supported across government, alongside grassroots
organizations, policy champions and civil society groups to enhance their success. However, governance
arrangements involving coalitions between public and private sector actors need to recognize power asymmetries
among different actors and mitigate their potentially negative consequences. Such arrangements should include
clear mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability of all partners, and prevent undue influence by
industry interests associated with unhealthy products.
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There is now clear evidence that the excess consumption
of added sugars, notably in sugar-sweetened beverages
(SSBs), is associated with diet-related non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) [1]. Taxing SSB has be-
come an increasingly supported policy intervention for
reducing the NCD burden, with 40 countries imple-
menting such taxes by 2019 [2]. Five Latin American
countries enacted legislation for a SSB tax between 2014
and 2018, including Mexico (January 2014), Chile (Janu-
ary 2015), Dominican Republic (September 2015),
Ecuador (May 2016) and Peru (May 2018) [3]. Mexico
and Chile were early adopters of SSB taxes and
Colombia attempting implementation in 2015, even be-
fore it was defined as a “best buy” intervention by inter-
national organizations [4]. However, World Health
Organization (WHO) recommendations regarding SSB
taxation have elicited much debate [5–8]. Some evidence
suggests the financial and health impacts of these policy
instruments remain inconclusive [5–7, 9] while policy-
makers face varied challenges when designing health-
related taxes [10–13]. Clouding public policy debate on
this issue has been the substantial participation of vested
commercial interests, notably large transnational corpo-
rations (TNCs) as SSB producers, whose profits are
threatened by proposed fiscal measures [14]. Their polit-
ical and economic power, across all levels of government
[15], and the limited accountability and transparency
mechanisms available to governments and civil society
groups to monitor their undue influence, raises concerns
about industry interference and conflicts of interest dur-
ing the policy making process [6, 16–18]. In this context,
it remains unclear how best countries can engage stake-
holders in developing and implementing SSB taxes in
the Latin American region and beyond. What are the
optimal levels and structure of SSB taxation? How best
might such taxes be framed to fit local political and eco-
nomic contexts [17, 19]?
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this discus-
sion through a critical review of the SSB taxation experi-
ence in Mexico, Chile and Colombia through a problem-
driven political economy analysis. We describe how
TNCs, through their economic and political power, have
influenced the policy agenda on SSB taxation in these
countries. The findings are used to identify broader les-
sons for protecting public health goals when developing
and implementing fiscal policies that advance NCD pre-
vention and control policies.
The political economy of SSB production and
consumption in Latin America
In 2012, the Latin American region became the world’s
leading consumer of SSBs, contributing substantially to
global growth in consumption over the previous decade[20]. A global analysis of the estimated daily caloric in-
take from SSBs per capita in 2015 found that four of the
top ten countries were in Latin America: Chile (166
kcal/day/person), Mexico (158 kcal/day/person),
Argentina (135 kcal/day/person), and Brazil (90 kcal/day/
person) [21]. While economic hardship, due to high in-
flation and currency depreciation, have changed con-
sumption levels in unpredictable ways in the region
since 2015 [22, 23], the beverage industry continues to
identify the Latin American region as a major SSB
growth market [24].
TNCs involved in the production of SSB have been
major investors in Latin America in recent decades, en-
abling them to capture a large market share in the re-
gion [23]. In 2018 the total revenues of Femsa Coca-
Cola increased 6.8% over the previous year, reaching
$23.9 billion (USD), while 11% of PepsiCo’s income
($7.04 billion USD) came from Latin America [25, 26].
From 2000 to 2013, sales of ultra-processed foods and
SSBs increased from $38 billion (USD) to $81 billion
(USD), larger than any other region (PAHO, 2015). In
2013 retail sales in Latin America of SSBs were 110.7 l/
capita, with Mexico leading with 184.9 l/capita, followed
by Chile 170.2 and Argentina with 156.1 l/capita,
Uruguay with 123.7, Costa Rica 103.8 Guatemala 101.1 l/
capita, while Colombia had 81.5 l/capita [27]. The Coca-
Cola Company’s income before taxes in Latin America
for 2016 amounted to approximately 1.97 billion (USD)
with a retail value of $90 billion (USD), having a 48%
value share in the beverage market [28, 29]. In addition,
the market expansion and acquisition of smaller com-
panies and bottlers in the region [22, 23] has expanded
TNCs’ abilities to challenge regulatory measures that
threaten their consolidated profits and power [23].
Strategic efforts by TNCs to influence policy decisions
have been well documented for the food, beverage, alco-
hol and particularly tobacco industries [30–32]. A range
of market (economic) and non-market (political) strat-
egies have been employed, including constituency build-
ing, whereby relationships with key opinion leaders and
policymakers in the community and health organizations
are cultivated. TNCs, particularly SSB producers, have
engaged in countries´ social and poverty alleviation pro-
grams, such as the provision of safe drinking water and
nutrition education programs [22, 33]. Often these ini-
tiatives have taken the form of public-private partner-
ships (PPPs) or framed as corporate social responsibility
(CSR) [34].
The participation of TNCs in PPPs and CSR initiatives,
as multi-stakeholder initiatives, have previously raised
questions about asymmetries of power in global health
[35–37] and, more recently, in the political economy lit-
erature pertaining to Latin America [38, 39]. However,
the existing literature on the participation of TNCs in
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middle-income countries remains limited. Through ana-
lysis of three Latin American countries, this paper iden-
tifies lessons for pursuing similar disease prevention
policies while mitigating, when required, the potential
undue influence of TNCs on the policy process, and pol-
icy outcomes.
Methods
We conducted a qualitative synthesis of document
sources related to Mexico, Chile and Colombia between
January 2011 and May 2018 (Updated in December
2019). A qualitative synthesis systematically searches for
research on a topic, and draws the findings from individ-
ual studies together [40]. Case studies of Mexico, Chile
and Colombia were selected because Chile and Mexico
were the first two countries in Latin America (the region
with the highest consumption of SSB globally) to have
adopted SSB taxes, and Colombia is the only country in
Latin America that has attempted and failed to introduce
the tax (at the time of this review). The World Bank cat-
egorizes Mexico and Colombia as upper-middle-income
economies [41] and Chile as a high-income economy
[41]. They also share similar contextual factors such as
type of government, geographic location and language,
and they have similar obesity prevalence. In Mexico,
39% of adults are overweight and 33% are obese [42]. In
Chile these ratios are 39 and 34% [43] and in Colombia
56% of adults are overweight and 19% are obese [44].
We selected three high-SSB consuming countries in the
same region to identify common themes in the policyFig. 1 Search terms used for the documentary analysis and criteria to selecmaking process, focused on agenda-setting, to address
an urgent health priority. Also, we sought to explain dif-
ferences in the interaction between TNCs and health ad-
vocates during the policy process concerning SSB
taxation, especially given that the TNCs operate across
the three countries.
We began by conducting a systematic search of docu-
ments in English and Spanish. All articles were searched
and screened by AC, with 10% screened by AK for valid-
ation purposes. No discrepancies needed to be ad-
dressed. Criteria for selecting documents followed a
process similar to guidelines used in scoping reviews, de-
fined as “an examination of a broader area to identify
gaps in the research knowledge base, clarify key con-
cepts, and report on the types of evidence that address
an inform practice in the field” [45]. Documents were in-
cluded if they were either in English or Spanish, and
dated between January 2011 and December 2019 to
cover the period when SSB tax policies were developed
and implemented. Databases searched included Aca-
demic Complete, Scielo, Web of Science and Google
Scholar using the same terms (Fig. 1). Backward refer-
ence searching was then applied to identify further docu-
ments. We also searched the websites of key
stakeholders (identified after an initial screening of doc-
uments) to identify grey literature relevant to the ana-
lysis (listed in Fig. 2). Data included scientific
publications (reviews, research articles, case studies, and
commentaries), reports, newspaper articles, legal docu-
mentation and press releases by organizations and gov-
ernment officials generated before and during the sodat documents
Fig. 2 Stakeholders identified to be involved in SSB policy making by country
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inclusion literature related to the particular countries
analyzed (January 2011 to December 2019). After re-
moving duplicates, 35 peer-reviewed articles were in-
cluded and 36 non-peer-reviewed documents (26 were
reports either published by CSO or the SSB industry, 4
were legal documents, and 10 were either newspaper ar-
ticles, press releases or website content).
The analysis and synthesis involved an iterative reflex-
ive process by the authors, interpreting and developing
meaning from the collected information, based on their
expertise [46]. Findings were arranged as a narrative syn-
thesis with the identified themes, guided by a framework
put forth by the Overseas Development Institute to con-
duct applied political economy (PE) analysis [47]. We
used this framework of problem-driven political econ-
omy (PE) because of its useful differentiation between
structural features shaping an issue, including institu-
tional factors, and features shaping an issue related toindividual and organizational agency, including motiva-
tions, types of relationships and power dynamics among
actors or stakeholders. Further, while providing concep-
tual rigor, this framework also has the flexibility and
space to accommodate the concerns of our interdiscip-
linary research team, composed of researchers operating
from different epistemologies. This problem-driven pol-
itical economy analysis approach has three phases: a)
problem identification, b) problem diagnosis; and c) con-
siderations of the plausible change process (Fig. 3). We
identified the problem as TNCs’ influence of SSB tax-
ation policy in Latin America. The problem diagnosis in-
cludes issues of structure and agency described below in
the results section [47]. Structural issues included the
broader institutional arrangements shaping the relation-
ships among key actors within the policy process, and
the governance principles of transparency, accountability
and participation. Agency issues included the political
and business strategies of stakeholders seeking to frame
Fig. 3 Analytical framework based on problem driven political economy framework Overseas Development Institute
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assessed how TNCs and local SSB producers influenced
(or sought to influence) the design and implementation
of SSB taxes with the main constraint of not following
experts recommendation (20% tax minimum) to have a
health impact. For this analysis, influence refers to the
capacity of an individual or an organization to have an
effect on the development or behaviour of someone or
something. Finally, we addressed the last dimension of
the PE framework by identifying challenges and oppor-
tunities, along with lessons learned, for introducing SSB
taxation in other contexts.Results
The role of structure and agency in SSB taxation policy
debates.
Mexico
In 2012, results of the Mexican National Health and Nu-
trition Survey showed that 72.2% of the adult population
was either obese or overweigh [48]. CSOs (civil society
organizations) collectively started promoting SSB tax-
ation in 2012 and proposing ways to increase it consecu-
tive years. In 2013, following a year of strong civil
society advocacy, President Enrique Peña Nieto launched
the National Obesity and Diabetes Prevention Strategy.
In 2013, a comprehensive Fiscal Reform proposed by the
Ministry of Finance (MoF) also came into effect. Both
policy instruments included a tax on SSBs and snacks
with more than 250 kcal per 100 g (10 and 8% respect-
ively). The final document was highly criticized by advo-
cacy groups due to its argued loopholes; nevertheless, it
was highly promoted by the government and accepted
by the food and beverage industry (F&BI) after initial op-
position [49].The main proponent of the SSB tax was the Senate in
December 2012, but it was rejected by the Congress
(both Senate and Deputies chambers) in May 2013. That
same year, the policy was overridden by the MoF as part
of the President’s Fiscal Reform. A 1MXP per liter was
accepted by Congress in October 2013. CSOs) advocat-
ing for the measure were Alianza por la Salud Alimen-
taria, El Poder del Consumidor, Fundación Mídete and
the ContraPESO Coalition, all supported by Bloomberg
Philanthropies. Academics from the National Institute of
Public Health and Aspen Institute also engaged in policy
debates and processes. TNCs and national SSB pro-
ducers opposed the measure, and were represented by
several business chambers including ConMexico, Conca-
min and ANPRAC (see Fig. 2).
An SSB tax was enacted in 2014 amid the conver-
gence of several factors: a) evidence of poor results
from self-regulatory measures for industry; b) high
rates of obesity in the country; c) a new government
administration seeking additional revenue sources;
and e) an organized CSO advocacy campaign [18].
Notably, F&BI representatives also provided input on
policy design, claiming their interests aligned with
public health objectives. These factors positioned SSB
taxation favourably on the policy agenda and facili-
tated its passage into law. Several key events took
place after the enacting of the new tax in January
2014. The President agreed with ConMexico (industry
consortium - Consejo Mexicano de la Industria de
Productos de Consumo) that it would not increase
the tax further after it came into effect; and a re-
search institute established by the Coca-Cola Com-
pany was inaugurated by President Nieto, the health
minister, and CEO of Coca-Cola Mexico. CSOs how-
ever advocated for a doubling of the tax [18].
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launched the Mexican Observatory on Non-
communicable Diseases (OMENT – Observatorio Mexi-
cano de Enfermedades No Transmisibles), as the Advis-
ory Council delegated to monitor and evaluate the
National Obesity and Diabetes Prevention Strategy. The
Advisory Council included 20 representatives from the
public sector, academia, professional organizations, civil
society organizations, and industry-related representa-
tives [50]. The two most influential of the latter were
ConMexico, representing SSB producers, and the Aspen
Institute Mexico, sponsored by and with strong ties to
the SSB industry. Notably, none of the National Health
Institutes were represented on the Council, nor were
any of the consumer groups that had been instrumental
in the promotion of the SSB tax. By the end of 2014, the
OMENT had not produced reported on the impact of
the SSB tax or even established indicators for assessing
this impact. Meanwhile, an independent group led by
the National Institute of Public Health, funded by
Bloomberg Philanthropies, had reported a decrease in
consumption [18, 51, 52].
According to the government, the Mexican SSB tax
generated approximately US$1.2 billion in 2014 [53]. Al-
though the regulation that introduced the tax designated
funds (earmark) to increase access to clean water in
schools, it remains unclear how the revenues were actu-
ally spent. In 2015, while advocating for an increase to
the SSB tax, CSOs reported being harassed anonymously
for their efforts [54].
Chile
In 2014, the Chilean MoF proposed the largest tax re-
form in three decades, with the aim of raising revenue
for comprehensive educational reforms. Beverage taxes
in Chile have existed since 1979, when the government
introduced specific ad valorem taxes on alcoholic and
non-alcoholic industrialized beverages, including SSBs.
These beverages were initially subject to a 15% tax, re-
duced to 13% in 1985. The 2014 reform included a pro-
posal to increase taxes on SSBs. The inclusion of a 20%
tax on all SSB and an increased tax on all tobacco and
alcohol products were advocated for by CSO groups
through media campaigns, opinion pieces in newspapers,
and public actions. Arguments were mainly health-
related, focusing on the high consumption of SSB and
60% prevalence of obesity in the adult population [9].
Additionally, tax supporters highlighted the state’s re-
sponsibility to protect vulnerable populations through
legislation [55].
The main proponent of the tax was the MoF through
the fiscal reform process. In the beginning, the Ministry
of Health (MoH) was indirectly involved through its
work on similar regulations for healthy eating whichincluded food labelling and marketing to children. CSO
proponents of both initiatives were the Coalition for a
Healthy Chile (Frente por un Chile Saludable), Senator
Guido Girardi, and academics from the Institute of Nu-
trition and Food Technology (Instituto Nacional de
Nutricióny Tenconlogía Alimentaria INTA) and Univer-
sity of Chile. The private sector was mainly represented
by A.B Chile, a national consortium of national and
transnational food and beverage producers (See Fig. 2).
The F&BI contested the SSB tax proposal, based on
similar arguments used by tobacco and alcohol indus-
tries, and in other SSB tax cases. They argued job losses,
negative effects on the economy and trade, restriction of
freedom of choice, regressivity (greater impact on the
poorest groups) of the tax, the imposition of a ´nanny
state´ and the ´arbitrary discrimination´ argument ques-
tioning the legality of the proposal [8]. Lobbying with
congressional members intensified, and powerful coali-
tions were formed in opposition to the regulation. Few
regulations were in place in the country to prohibit cor-
porate lobbying and financing of political campaigns.
Therefore some legislators and members of the MoF,
heavily lobbied by industry interests, became opponents
of the tax [56]. A coalition of stakeholders then aligned
with the F&BI to reduce the SSB tax to 5%, far below
the 20% recommended by CSOs to curb consumption
(Table 1). This was further undermined by incorporating
a tax exemption for some ‘low-sugar’ SSBs (less than 15
g per 240 ml) [57]. Thus, as happened in Mexico, the tax
reform included amendments reducing the level of the
tax and limiting its potential impact on consumption.
Simultaneously, an intense debate about implementing
a regulatory framework began which included a restriction
on marketing of unhealthy food to children, and front-of-
pack warning labels informing consumers when a product
is high in calories, sugars, fats and salt [58, 59]. After long
discussions and pressure from F&BI lobbyists, the regula-
tion finally came into effect in 2015 [60]. After the experi-
ence with the SSB tax, the National Association of
Beverage Producers became A.B. Chile, and hired a former
member of parliament and prominent politician to be its
representative. Since the implementation of the law, TNCs
have filed several lawsuits against the Chilean State chal-
lenging the legality of restricting their trademarks, cases
which are still pending [60]. At the international level,
TNCs supported by World Trade Organization (WTO)
argued the new labeling violates several trade rules and is
an obstacle to international trade, thus the labeling stayed
as Chile argued for the basic right to protect human
health [61] [62].
Colombia
Colombia’s political context is key to understanding the
policy process involved in the promotion and, ultimately,





Political context Entering president in 2013 Major tax reform in October 2014 Tax reform project (SSB




37.8% overweight and 32.4% obesity among
adults (70.2% combined prevalence)
36% overweight and obesity in children (5 to
10y) [1]
39.8% overweight and 34.4% obesity among






obesity in children (5 to
10y) [3]
SSB retail sales in
2013 [4]
184.9 l/capita 170.2 l/capita 81.5 l/capita
Regulatory instruments, content and reported impact
Regulation used to
frame the policy
Fiscal reform (January 2014)
Obesity policy
Fiscal reform (October 2014) Obesity policy
Fiscal reform
Type of tax and
rate
Excise tax of 20%/
Excise tax of 1 MXP/l (≈ 10%)
Two-tired
High sugar content (HSC): Ad Valormen 18% (>
6.25 g sugar/100 mL 20%)
Low sugar content (LSC): Ad Valorem 10% (<
6.25 g sugar/100 mL)
Excise tax 20%
None
Earmarked tax No, but the Senate passed a resolution to
allocate a proportion of the SSB to provide






Daily per capita purchases decreased by an
average of 6% (− 12 mL/capita/day) of taxed
SSB.
Low socioeconomic status households had an
average decline between 9 and 17%
compared with pre-tax monthly trends of
2013 [5].
Monthly per capita purchases of taxed HSC SSB
decreased by 3.4% by volume (95% CI −5.9−
−0.9%) and 4.0% by calories (95% CI −6.3−
−1.9%)
The volume of household purchases of LSC SSB
increased 10.7% (95% CI 7.5–13.9%)) [6].
NA
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*Outlined also in Fig. 2
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2015, the Minister of Health convened a group of ex-
perts to draft a series of proposals for a health tax to beincluded in a tax reform project and be presented to the
Congress by 2016. The proposal included plans to in-
crease the tobacco tax and to introduce a new SSB tax
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and policy debates around the government’s peace refer-
endum with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC),
which was finally achieved in November 2016 [63]. The
latter resulted in a convoluted political scenario and one
that could be argued as influencing the rejection of the
tax, as the policy agenda was highly focused on the
peace referendum.
The initiative to introduce a SSB tax came from the
MoH, and was supported by CSOs and coalitions such
as Educar Consumidores and Colombian Alliance for
Healthy Eating (Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria
Colombia), and an alliance of several other CSOs who
joined to support the new fiscal measure. Academics
supporting the measure were based at Universidad
Javeriana, while the main representatives of the TNCs
and SSB producers included Postobón, ANDI, FENA
LCO and SIC (see Fig. 2).
A SSB tax was proposed in 2016, supported by the
government and CSO groups, but was ultimately not ap-
proved. The CSO Educar Consumidores was the main
advocate for a 20% tax on SBBs, just as was advocated n
Mexico and Chile, but the tax was voted against after
several months under Congress scrutiny. Similar to
Mexico and Chile, intense industry lobbying of Congress
was undertaken, and anonymous harassment of activists
(proponents of the tax) was reported [64].
Public statements by the Chamber of the Beverage In-
dustry representative denied the benefits of the SSB tax.
Pro-industry members argued that the SSB tax would
cause job losses among the poor and that “the impact is
of great concern especially in those people living in rural
areas where bottled drinks constitute the sole reliable
source of water” [65]. Meanwhile the F&BI TNCs collab-
orated in PPPs and CSR initiatives such as the establish-
ment of the International Energy Balance Network, led
by the Coca-Cola Company, and recruitment of allies in
the country [66]. The industry also provided drinking
water in poor communities, in collaboration with other
partners [67]. The drinking water availability as a sub-
jacent causal path to an hydration issue related to high
consumption of SSB goes beyond the soda tax policy.
Many countries such as Mexico, Chile and Colombia
have water spring concessions (use and exploitation) and
the governance of water access has loopholes that favour
TNCs [68, 69].
The SSB industry strongly lobbied against the tax. For
example, in September 2016 the National Association of
Businessman in Colombia (ANE) and Postobón, a local
subsidiary of a SSB TNC, won an important lawsuit
against the State [63]. This lawsuit demanded the Super-
intendent of Industry and Trade to withdraw an advo-
cates’ media campaign on the negative effects of SSB tax,
claiming that it presented false and misleadinginformation. Additionally, during the spring and summer
of 2016, the media debate intensified. The newspaper
Vice Colombia published three opinion pieces support-
ing the measure, shortly before its editor was abruptly
fired, increasing public demands for accountability. Polls
conducted by CSOs showed that 70% of the population
favoured the measure, and 42 of 268 members of Con-
gress supported it [64]. However, after intense lobbying
in late 2016, it was finally rejected by Congress. This
case mirrored the other two cases but was unsuccessful,
with no window for further discussion under the current
political administration.
The role of ideas, framing of SSB taxation and power
dynamics.
Motivations and framing for and against SSB taxes
Important differences were found in understanding the
ways in which values and evidence were used to motiv-
ate and frame policy design in each country. First, while
the MoF drove the SSB taxation initiative in Mexico and
Chile, in Colombia the main proponent was the MoH,
with support from the CSO. While both the initiatives in
Colombia and Mexico originated within MoH, and were
framed as part of a comprehensive plan to tackle obesity,
in Chile it was only included as part of a broader fiscal
reform. These findings suggest that policy change was in
part attributable to inter-ministerial synergy of the gov-
ernment in framing the policy debate. While the regula-
tory instruments were the same, framing the SSB tax as
a health-related policy appears to have legitimized public
discourse, although economic arguments were always
needed. This is a core mandate of the MoH, not MoF,
which potentially explains variations in frame sponsor-
ship across the countries. The MoH in Chile and Mexico
participated to a limited extent in drafting the SSB tax,
in both cases the MoH supported the measure, although
in Mexico the support came much after its approval in
Congress, as Mercedes Juan, the Secretariat of Health
had close links to the food industry [18].
Nevertheless, SSB taxation was framed beyond a public
health rationale. In Mexico and Chile, SSB taxes were
framed as a revenue generation mechanism [14, 18]. In
Colombia, where the tax was largely framed as a health
intervention, the need to raise additional revenue was
not substantively communicated as it was in the other
two countries, and largely failed to gain traction in a
crowded political agenda.
Second, as shown in Table 1, the type and rate of the
tax in each country varied, and all three failed to pass
taxes of 20%, the minimum price increase considered by
experts to have a substantial impact on obesity rates in a
short span of time [70, 71]. While there is little evidence
on how the final level and type of taxation were estab-
lished (1MXP per litre in Mexico and a two-tier 5% in
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cases. The rationale behind setting the level of the tax
was not publicly available, and both taxes in Chile and
Mexico were significantly less than the evidence-based
simulations recommended [72, 73]. Still, there is evi-
dence that this can change; under the new presidential
administration (2018–2024), the Mexican SSB tax has
been increased due to inflation from 1.17 MXP per litre
to 1.26 MXP per litre, and might increase to 2.26 MXP
per litre [74].
Third, of the three countries only Mexico explicitly
outlined plans to evaluate the impact of the tax. This
was accomplished by launching a multi-sectoral platform
to report the impact of this and other policies included
in the MoH obesity strategy (Table 1). Nevertheless, to-
date, published impact evaluations of SSB taxes have
only been conducted by externally-funded academics
(Table 1). How government officials use this evidence is
unclear. For instance, in Mexico the opaque governance
of OMENT (which ceased operations in 2019), lacking
transparency and accountability mechanisms, means that
little is known about how these findings were received,
managed or supported, or how F&BI representatives
may have influenced the non-response.
In all three countries, legislation containing SSB taxes
was vague on its evidentiary basis. These included: a) a
lack of clarity around resource allocation using SSB rev-
enues to accelerate health gains, b) missing justification
for the chosen size of the SSB tax, c) an undefined plan
for multisectoral policy implementation and/or evalu-
ation; and d) in the specific case of Chile, rationale for
increasing the existing staggered levy on SSBs, with a
health-oriented purpose policy.
The role of relationships and power in coalition building
around SSB taxation
Our findings suggest that TNCs producing and selling
SSBs have remained for the last 20 years a long in a
powerful position in all the countries of study. For in-
stance, the former Mexican President Vicente Fox
(2002–2006) was previously the CEO of The Coca-Cola
Company-Mexico, and it was during Fox’s leadership of
Coca-Cola Mexico that it became Mexico’s top-selling
soft drink, increasing Coca-Cola’s sales by almost 50%
[75]. Mexican Coca-Cola-FEMSA (the largest Coca-Cola
subsidiary in the world, which The Coca-Cola-Mexico is
a shareholder with 28%) is one of the five largest con-
tributors to the gross domestic product (GDP) with
Bimbo, Gruma (both F&BI), Cemex, and Telmex. Coca-
Cola-FEMSA and PepsiCo, either directly or through
CONMEXICO or ANPRAC, have been involved with
political institutions, such as the Centre for Beverage
Innovation, opened in 2016 with the MoH and the
Mexican President.In Colombia, Postobón was one of the top 14 largest
companies contributing to the economy; from 2016 to
2017, its income increased by 4.7%. The beverage com-
pany has many social programs, including a university
and a large program to promote active lifestyles. It has
been awarded by national and international institutions,
such as the Swedish Business Network in Colombia and
the Institute of Internal Auditors of Colombia and the
Secretariat of Transparency of the Presidency, allowing
the company to improve its reputation and open busi-
ness opportunities in the region´ [76].
In Chile the main opponents to the SSB tax were
members of the National Association of Beverage Pro-
ducers (Asociación Nacional de Bebidas Refrescantes –
ANBER), including Coca-Cola Andina (Embotelladora
Andina y Embotelladoras Coca-Cola-Polar), Embonor,
and CCU. In 2011, the association reported an increase
in SSB consumption of 11.8%, described as related to
“growing the economy by the increase in jobs opportun-
ities” [77]. In 2014, just before the SSB tax was included
in the fiscal reform, ANBER became A.B.Chile (Alimen-
tos y Bebidas Chile), growing the consortium as Nestlé
and Carozzi joined. To date, it is the country’s most
powerful food and beverage group, representing more
than 20 companies [78].
Coalitions formed against the SSB tax policy were
mainly composed by TNCs and national SBB producers
(which some were acquired by TNCs in the process), in-
cluding business associations, confederations and trade
organizations, and in some cases relations with aca-
demics or CSOs, as some of the boards of trustees’ or
advisors were part of the F&BI [79] (Fig. 2). Part of their
influence is likely attributable to their ability to leverage
financial and strategic resources to position their views
in the pubic domain. The representatives of such coali-
tions engaged in discourse around cooperation with
public health aims, and built alliances with local and na-
tional government entities [80].
In contrast, powerful coalitions were also formed for
the purpose of supporting the tax. They represented sev-
eral CSOs and academics, mainly via the Alianza por la
Salud Alimentaria (both in Mexico and Colombia) and
by Frente por un Chile Saludable in Chile. In Colombia,
CSOs were advised by some academics, but academics
did not lead the call. In Mexico, by contrast, academics
led research underpinning SSB taxation, supported the
drafting of the bill, and assisted with advocacy efforts
[18, 80]. In Chile, while well-known public health aca-
demics were supportive of the measure, they were
mainly advocating for other policy measures, such as
warning labels on snacks and beverages, and had a long-
standing close relationship with some policy entrepre-
neurs in bringing the policy to the agenda-setting
process. At the time of the policy debates, and agenda
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national organizations, and prestigious US based aca-
demics, supporting the coalitions [81]. However, in
Chile, the Nutrition and Technology Institute in Chile
(INTA), a prestigious academic institution supporting
the legislation, was undermined by undisclosed conflicts
of interest that damaged its credibility [56].
In the cases of Mexico and Colombia, corporate inter-
ests influenced the media. In Colombia, the largest soda
producer in the country owns the primary media outlet.
Therefore advertising by CSOs supporting the tax was
denied. Likewise, in Mexico, CSOs reported that the two
main broadcasting corporations denied space for their
campaign showing the amount of sugar in SSBs and
other similar campaigns designed to support the meas-
ure. Regardless of a clear power imbalance surrounding
the public policy debate between those who supported
or opposed the tax, in Mexico, the pro-tax coalitions, led
by civil society, maintained a powerful position in public
opinion.
In Chile, debates centered around broader regulatory
measures and the principles behind fiscal reform, with
little focus on the specifics of a SSB tax. The primary
frame sponsor for regulatory changes was the Senate
head of the Health Commission, Guido Girardi, a
media-savy spokesman of CSOs and academics [82].
Likewise, in Mexico, a Senator, Marcela Torres, advo-
cated for the SSB tax, and built a strong coalition with
Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria, academics and the
country office of the Panamerican Health Organization
(PAHO), by positioning the tax as a health measure on
the policy agenda. In Colombia, CSOs gained important
public support for the SSB tax through polls and social
media, but policy entrepreneurs within the private sector
were able to leverage Congressional contacts to success-
fully counter the measure.
Discussion
This study provides important insights into how the
problem of obesity has been defined, and the role of SSB
taxation in addressing this problem in Latin America.
We describe the importance of the political and eco-
nomic context, the actors involved in the policy debates,
the dynamic ways in which SSB taxes were framed, and
the coalitions formed to mobilize vested interests. In
doing so, our findings reveal the often opaque means by
which TNCs can assert influence in the policy process.
This raises important implications for the governance of
TNCs when seeking to use fiscal measures to reduce
consumption of health-harming products.
The ways in which SSB taxes were framed in each
country was critical to their success. As a means of
recruiting social values to make complex policy positions
comprehensible, framing is an emerging subject ofinquiry in the health policy process [83]. In all three
countries, CSOs and academics emphasized social re-
sponsibility by raising concerns about the impact of SSB
consumption on obesity and diabetes, as well as access
to safe drinking water [84]. Civil society and grassroots
groups wielded arguments about improving access to
healthy food and safe drinking water to promote public
revenue allocation towards health concerns. The main
outcome of such arguments was widespread public sup-
port and further galvanizing coalitions of CSOs in all
three cases. Nevertheless, in Mexico and Chile, the MoF
was instrumental in framing SSB taxes as a fiscal meas-
ure, a finding consistent with similar research in Mexico
and Chile [81]. In Mexico, such arguments gained pur-
chase on the policy agenda as revenue funds were legally
assigned to provide water fountains in schools [85, 86],
but this was neither the case in Chile nor in Colombia.
Concurrently, in all cases TNCs used arguments about
their legal rights and obligations, free choice, nanny state
and freedom of intellectual property right, as they had
done to oppose food-marketing policy in Chile [58], and
reminiscent of the tobacco and alcohol industries’ strat-
egies [87]. In Chile and Mexico, SSB companies argued
against the tax on the basis of the right of free consump-
tion, while in Colombia they applied litigation measures
to CSOs advertising against consuming SBB outlining
the health risk this implies. This is notable as it demon-
strates the extent to which TNC influence is tied to
framing in the media.
In these cases, TNCs were also able to negotiate dir-
ectly with government regarding policy implementation,
successfully subverting policy design so that levels of
levels of SSB taxation were not aligned with the existing
evidence-based recommendations, and some beverages
were declared exempt from the tax. Others have ob-
served these phenomena in Chile and Mexico [81] and
the Philippines [88]. In Colombia, even when advocates
managed to raise the topic in public debate, political tac-
tics from the industry opposing SSB taxes were strong
enough to prevent it from reaching the policy and legis-
lative agenda. In all three cases, the power of TNCs in-
fluenced policy discussions and outcomes.
Despite recent progress, the regulatory environment
continues to be a major obstacle for addressing un-
healthy foods and SSB consumption in most countries.
In response, TNCs are increasingly focusing on emer-
ging economies such as in Latin America, East Asia and
Africa, with hopes to influence regulatory actions [21].
Our research suggests that this is particularly true in
Mexico, Chile, and Colombia. As with tobacco compan-
ies, SSB companies have faced unexpected regulatory
changes in LMICs and have adapted to contain the dam-
age [87]. Therefore, companies have embarked upon re-
mediation actions by strengthening PPPs and corporate
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strong regional and international networks through con-
sortiums or charitable organizations. These strategies
allow local fiscal benefits to foreign investors and might
have direct effects on consumption patterns and may re-
duce public health policy space, as has happened in
Myanmar with Coca Cola investments [89]. Our findings
concur with tactics used by the tobacco industry and by
the food industry in other countries [89]. Furthermore,
these cases reflect that including several government
agencies and strengthening grassroots movements and
CSOs, having key policy champions, and having a multi-
sectorial approach to the measure, outlining it in several
policy documents, are key elements for fiscal policies to
successfully navigate the health policy process, and has
been recognized as a key element for policy success in
other case studies [12, 81, 88, 90].
This study also found related concerns of transparency
and accountability during policy design for SSB taxes in
Mexico, Chile and Colombia. Modifications to the ori-
ginal proposals (20% tax) were not documented by offi-
cial government sources. Secondary data documents
suggest that TNCs influenced the final amount of the
levy in both Mexico and Chile [8, 18]. Mechanisms to
protect such influence lack in all cases, a clear govern-
ance loophole identified by others [37], which has not
yet been addressed at the national or global level [15].
Additionally, how the revenues of the soda tax may sup-
port public health interventions is unclear. For instance,
In Mexico some schools were provided drinking foun-
tains by the PPPs established with Coca-Cola [91]. Ac-
cording to some evaluations in Chile, prices of untaxed
beverages decreased, but taxed products did not suffi-
ciently increase in price to reduce consumption. Never-
theless, the latest evaluation of the SSB tax found
significant decreases in the volume of all soft drinks con-
sumed and the monthly purchased volume of the
higher-taxed sugary soft drinks by 21.6% [73]. TheseFig. 4 Governance gaps identified in the three casesfindings suggest principles of transparency and account-
ability during policy design and implementation were
dismissed in general (Fig. 4).
Our findings challenge established discourse about pri-
vate sector participation in policy design concerning
harmful products. As a means of enhancing participation
and generating consensus, the global governance dis-
course continues to advocate for NCD control through
public-private (or multi-stakeholder) partnerships [4,
92]. Our research suggests, however, that TNCs distort
public health agendas with an undue influence and by
unfairly leveraging their resources to limit evidence-
informed debate. This is particularly worrying for pro-
cesses of institutionalization, whereby patterns of rela-
tionships can lead to further entrenched opposition to
reasoned debate [93]. Moreover, public-private partner-
ships in health often involve powerful interests with con-
flicted aims that compete with public health prevention
strategies [35].
The problem-driven approach to political economy
analysis comprises three layers: identifying the problem,
mapping the contextual, political and institutional ar-
rangements around the SSB taxation and identifying the
political economy drivers. This provides lessons about
the obstacles, challenges and opportunities a SSB tax-
ation initiative might face in similar contexts. It followed
a qualitative synthesis based on a documentary analysis,
which included a triangulation process between different
sources to improve the reliability and validity of the in-
formation. The fact that several of our observations are
shared by a similar analysis using primary data con-
ducted by Fuster et al. [81] further underscores the util-
ity of this approach. Nevertheless, some weaknesses
were faced, such as the scarce public available informa-
tion on the policy process for the countries included.
For this reason, more in-depth research is needed that
analyzes how stakeholders understand and shape the
policy process for SSB taxation in Latin America.
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governance. As TNCs, by definition, exist beyond state
boundaries, governance of their activities and power
must also occur at the global level. However, global
health governance is highly challenged by contradictory
and unclear guidelines by international organizations.
Two principles of governance are at stake; responsive-
ness and ´participation and consensus´. Both principles
lead to misinterpretation and open the door to powerful
corporate interests to incisively participate in policy de-
sign. Additionally, some global health recommendations
regarding policy actions to prevent NCDs, particularly
regarding risk factors such as tobacco consumption and
ultra-processed food availability, have evolved from
broad recommendations to specific actions, and have re-
cently focused more on engagement and governance ra-
ther than on policy implementation. This multi-country
case study demonstrates the potential mechanisms for
states to overcome TNC pressure.Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to better understand the gov-
ernance challenges of ensuring the primacy of public
health goals when designing and implementing SSB tax-
ation. This is achieved by critically reviewing the experi-
ence of Mexico, Chile and Colombia using problem-
driven political economy analysis. We identify lessons
for developing and applying SSB taxation for NCD pre-
vention goals. While it is important to consider a multi-
sectorial approach when framing SSB taxation, and
strong pro-tax coalitions were needed in all three coun-
tries to overcome entrenched opposition, these alliances
must adhere to clear principles of transparency, account-
ability and participation. Importantly, our findings show
how powerful industry-related actors seek to influence
the policy process for SSB taxation, from agenda setting
to implementation. TNCs producing and selling SSB
have historically enjoyed positions of economic and pol-
itical privilege in all three countries. Corporate coali-
tions have a powerful network of support in the
region and resources to strategically position their
views in the public domain to gain support. This in-
cludes industry representatives engaging in the dis-
course about PPPs and CSR with public health aims,
based on alliances with local or national government
entities. Efforts to advance SSB taxation thus need to
carefully navigate vested interests shaping national
and regional political economies. Countering the eco-
nomic arguments of TNCs and other powerful indus-
try actors can be achieved through adherence to good
governance principles, including support by legal
measures and broad alliances with CSOs, international
actors and government entities.Acknowledgements
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